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INTRODUCTION
When viewed from any coherent normative perspective, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines have failed to reduce disparity and probably have
increased it. Even on paper, these Guidelines often fail to treat like offenders
alike, and the Guidelines are worse in practice than on paper. The luck of the
judicial draw appears to determine the sentences offenders serve as much as or
more than it did before the Guidelines; the region of the country in which an
offender is sentenced now makes a greater difference than it did before the
Guidelines; and racial and gender disparities have increased.
Part I of this Article emphasizes that sentencing disparity is a partly
* Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Chicago. I am
grateful for the perceptive comments of Welsh S. White.
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normative rather than an entirely empirical concept. It shows how the U.S.
Sentencing Commission's initial evaluation of the Guidelines neglected this
fact, proclaiming the Guidelines a success simply because judges in the post-
Guidelines period came closer to following them than judges did before there
were guidelines to apply.
Part II considers the disparities created by the Guidelines. Guidelines
principles that appear plausible in some situations may prove nonsensical in
others. Moreover, the penalties set by the Sentencing Commission frequently
fail to follow a coherent pattern. I
Part III focuses on the kinds of disparities the Guidelines were designed to
prevent-those resulting from the identity of the sentencing judge, the region of
the country in which an offender is sentenced, and the offender's race,
ethnicity, or gender. It examines the empirical evidence bearing on these
questions, particularly that generated by the Sentencing Commission and its
staff. As the Commission's studies show, geographic disparity, the unequal
treatment of racial and ethnic groups, and disparities between the sentences of
women and men have increased in the Guidelines era. The Commission
maintains that the amount of disparity attributable to the identity of the
sentencing judge has declined, but this claim is unconvincing. Although the
1. The Sentencing Commission has insisted for eighteen years that its initial
"Guidelines for most crimes were based on past practices" as revealed by "detailed data
drawn from more than 10,000 reports of offenders sentenced in 1985 and additional data
from approximately 100,000 more federal convictions." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN
YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM Is ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 14-15 (2004) [hereinafter
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT]. In fact, the Commission considered the
average sentences only of offenders in each offense category who had been sentenced to
prison, and prior to the Guidelines, more than 40% of all federal offenders received
sentences other than imprisonment. Converting the average sentences of imprisoned
offenders into the Guidelines sentences for all offenders would have produced an enormous
increase in sentence severity. The Commission guarded against this danger only by
"eyeballing" the percentage of offenders in each category who had been sentenced to prison
and by reducing Guidelines sentences below the prior averages when this percentage was
low. Determining how much to reduce the prior averages was simply a matter of guesswork.
This flawed process ultimately produced substantial increases in federal sentences. It
replicated prior sentence levels only for crimes so serious that nearly all offenders went to
prison even before the Guidelines. See Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea
Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459, 467-68 (1988); see also U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND POLICY STATEMENTS 27-34 tbl. I (a) (1987); Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H.
Robinson to the Promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing
Commission, 5 & n.11 (1987), reprinted in 41 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3174 (1987).
Since its promulgation of the initial Guidelines, the Commission has raised sentences
far more often than it has reduced them. Every crime du jour appears to prompt an increase
in punishment and a press release. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
Commission Tightens Requirements for Corporate and Ethics Programs (May 3, 2004)
(proclaiming that the Commission's actions would "lead to a new era of corporate
compliance"), http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0504.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
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Commission's figures show a small reduction of judge-created disparity in the
sentences initially imposed, they indicate no reduction of disparity in the
sentences offenders ultimately serve.
Prior to the Guidelines, the United States Parole Commission, an agency
with guidelines of its own, determined the release dates of prisoners sentenced
by judges throughout America. If this Commission succeeded in reducing
interjudge disparity even moderately, it almost certainly achieved greater
success than that now claimed for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 2 The
Guidelines appear to have failed at every job they were designed to do.
Although the Guidelines' failure can be seen in the Commission's
statistics, these statistics do no more than skim the surface of the inequalities
the Guidelines permit and encourage. Judge-created disparities, for example,
are less likely to appear as visible departures from the Guidelines or as
differing sentences within authorized Guidelines ranges than as differing
applications of Guidelines provisions. Researchers do not treat judicial
disagreement about the factual and legal questions and the issues of
characterization that arise in Guidelines application as "sentencing disparity."
Moreover, the Guidelines have vastly increased the sentencing power of
prosecutors while reducing the ability of judges to check this power. The final
Part of this Article focuses on sentencing disparities that statistical analysis is
unlikely to detect or measure--disparities "under the radar" produced by
judges, defense attorneys, probation officers, law enforcement officers, and
prosecutors.
I. THE NORMATIVE NATURE OF DISPARITY
What counts as sentencing disparity is inescapably normative. 3 For many
people, the archetype of unequal sentencing is "sentencing by lottery."4 In a
system of punishment by lottery, however, every offender would be treated like
every other who drew the same number. When we say that punishment by
lottery is unequal or capricious, we mean that this practice is morally
incoherent. Drawing the same number is not the kind of "likeness" we believe
should matter. Equality requires the consistent application of a comprehensible
normative principle or mix of principles to different cases.
For this reason, evidence that offenders who have committed the same
2. The Commission has data that could resolve this issue more clearly. See infra text
accompanying note 56. Of course the Parole Commission did not reduce disparity in the
decision whether to imprison comparable offenders. The Sentencing Commission addressed
this issue by authorizing imprisonment for all federal offenders and by mandating it for the
overwhelming majority of these offenders.
3. The word "disparity" can mean either inequality or difference. In this sentence, I use
it to mean inequality. Inequality is another word for "unwarranted" disparity.
4. See, e.g., Jane Barrett, Sentencing Environmental Crimes Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines-A Sentencing Lottery, 22 ENVTL. L. 1421 (1992).
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crime receive more uniform sentences under a guidelines system than they
would have without them does not establish that the guidelines have reduced
disparity. Judges in the pre-guidelines period might not have sought to treat
everyone who committed the same crime alike. They might have tried to treat
offenders of equal moral culpability alike or offenders of equal dangerousness
alike or offenders with equal rehabilitative prospects alike. If these judges
consistently applied a coherent principle or mix of principles to their cases,
researchers could not fairly conclude that the guidelines had reduced disparity.
They could conclude only that the guidelines had applied a new set of
sentencing principles.
The United States Sentencing Commission sometimes has neglected this
fact. In a 1991 report mandated by Congress on the first four years of the
Sentencing Guidelines' operation, 5 the Commission compared cases in four
offense categories in which sentences had been imposed in a pre-Guidelines
period to what it regarded as comparable cases that arose after implementation
of the Guidelines. 6 The Commission matched cases on the basis of factors the
Guidelines deemed relevant to sentencing, such as drug quantity. The
Commission then announced that its Guidelines had substantially reduced
variation in the sentences judges imposed. The Commission had put the rabbit
in the hat, however, by matching cases on the basis of the same factors the
Guidelines used to set sentences. The Commission had treated its own view of
appropriate sentencing as the measure of equality.
7
The Commission's study had other methodological flaws, 8 and after
5. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON
THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN
SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA
BARGAINING (1991).
6. The Guidelines were not implemented in all federal courts until the Supreme Court
upheld their constitutionality in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Before
Mistretta, more than 200 federal district judges had held the Guidelines unconstitutional. See
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1990).
7. See James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Disparity: Before and After the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 280 (1999) (offering essentially this
criticism of the Sentencing Commission's report).
8. The Commission excluded cases in which defendants had cooperated with the
government, thereby ensuring that a likely source of post-Guidelines disparity would not mar
its conclusions. Under the Guidelines, a judge may not reduce a sentence on grounds of
"substantial assistance" unless a prosecutor asks him to do so. Then, however, the judge
must determine whether and by how much to depart without any guidance. See Patti B. Saris,
Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One
Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1027, 1044-53 (1999). Moreover, ajudge in the
pre-Guidelines period ordinarily determined only the maximum period the Parole
Commission could hold an offender, and usually this period was substantially longer than the
judge expected the offender to serve. The possibility of release on parole vanished with the
Guidelines. Although the Guidelines generally increased the amount of time served by
offenders, they often reduced the length of the sentences initially imposed. Greater numerical
variation was to be expected in the pre-Guidelines sentences simply because they were
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reanalyzing some of the Commission's data, the General Accounting Office
rejected the Commission's conclusion that the Guidelines had reduced disparity
even in the sentences judges initially imposed. 9
Unlike the Commission's later studies, its four-year evaluation considered
the sentences offenders were expected to serve as well as the sentences judges
imposed. In most of the Commission's comparison groups, it failed to show,
even by its own measure, a statistically significant reduction of variation in the
sentences offenders could expect to serve. The Parole Commission apparently
had reduced disparity in the pre-Guidelines period as effectively as the
Guidelines did thereafter. Although judges may not have followed the
Sentencing Guidelines before they existed, the Parole Commission came
surprisingly close to doing so.
II. THE DISPARITIES THAT THE GUIDELINES CREATE
Sentencing researchers typically announce that their goal is to study
unwarranted disparity and that unwarranted disparity does not include the
differences in punishment authorized by legislatures and sentencing
commissions.1 0 It is of course a truism that legally authorized sentencing
considerations are warranted by law (whether or not they are warranted by
common sense), and the researchers have no desire to quarrel with legislatures
and sentencing commissions about sentencing policy. From the researchers'
perspective, the disparities created by sentencing guidelines are warranted
simply because the sentencing commission has said they are.
This perspective, however, cuts off half the action. Adopting the viewpoint
of a person of ordinary moral sensibilities rather than of the Sentencing
Commission leads quickly to the conclusion that the Sentencing Guidelines
have substituted new disparities for old ones. This perspective suggests in fact
that the Guidelines have seriously aggravated the problem of disparity.
11
Consider, for example, Chapman v. United States,' in which a defendant
maintained that guidelines designed to promote equality violated the
constitutional requirement of equal protection.
At the time of the decision in Chapman, both the Federal Guidelines and
federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes determined an LSD dealer's
sentence by weighing the "mixture or substance" containing the drug. A "hit"
longer. In addition, critics complained that the Sentencing Commission's sample was not
large enough to permit meaningful conclusions. The Commission's tests of statistical
significance, however, seemed to answer this last objection.
9. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CENTRAL QUESTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED (1992).
10. See, e.g., Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on
Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 243-46 (1999).
11. One can reach these conclusions without measuring R-squareds and T-tests. As
Yogi Berra noted, "You can observe a lot by just watching."
12. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
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of LSD impregnated in a sugar cube, however, weighs much more than the
same hit in a square of blotter paper or a gelatin capsule. Under the Guidelines,
a dealer who sold 100 grams of LSD in sugar cubes was sentenced three times
more severely than one who sold the same quantity in blotter paper, seven
times more severely than one who used gelatin, and nineteen times more
severely than one who sold the LSD in pure form. Judge Richard Posner
commented, "[T]o base punishment on the weight of the carrier medium makes
about as much sense as basing punishment on the weight of the defendant."
1 3
Judges in the pre-Guidelines period may have been quirky, but determining
how many years to imprison someone by weighing sugar cubes was madness. 14
In Chapman, the Supreme Court construed the term "mixture or substance" to
include sugar cubes and held that this construction did not call the Guidelines'
constitutionality into question.
15
Although a post-Chapman amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines has
eliminated some of the disparities created by weighing "carrier media,"
16
disparities pervade the Guidelines. Mark Osler provides some illustrations:
Under [the Guidelines], a woman who holds just six grams of crack for her
own use is assigned a higher offense level than someone who commits
criminal sexual abuse of a minor, a man who commits negligent homicide by
13. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1333 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), aff'd sub nom., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
14. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHm. L. REv. 901, 920 (1991) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Failure of
Sentencing Guidelines]. In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, a post-
Chapman opinion by former Sentencing Commissioner and later Supreme Court Justice
Stephen G. Breyer compounded the insanity. A cocaine importer had chemically bonded
cocaine to the material of his suitcases, and the court held that his sentence should be
determined by weighing the suitcases. United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623 (1st
Cir. 1991). The court, however, did agree to omit the weight of the suitcases' metal fittings.
This ruling might have led defense attorneys to advise their drug-dealer clients that, if DEA
agents approached, they should never abandon their drugs in Boston Harbor. If they were
ever to do so, federal courts might weigh all the waters of the ocean to determine their
sentences.
Courts outside the First Circuit took a different view. The offender with the cocaine-
fiberglass suitcases received a sentence at least four years longer because his case was heard
in the First Circuit than he would have if the case had been heard in another court of appeals.
See Thomas J. Meier, Comment, A Proposal To Resolve the Interpretation of "Mixture or
Substance" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377,
402 (1993). The Sentencing Commission eventually took the position of the courts outside
the First Circuit. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1. 1, cmt. n.1 (2004).
15. Empiricists might have pronounced the Guidelines at issue in Chapman a great
success because offenders with equal weights of mixtures and substances received more
uniform sentences under the Guidelines than they would have without them.
16. In cases in which mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are inapplicable, the
Guidelines now make LSD sentences dependent on the number of doses possessed or sold.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, drug quantity tbl.n.H (2004). The weight of
the carrier medium still determines the mandatory minimum sentences in LSD cases,
however, as well as the Guidelines sentences for most other drugs. Id. at n.A.
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recklessly shaking a baby to death, a woman caught stealing six million
dollars of public money, or the executive who orders employees to dump a
truckload of toxic waste knowing that people may die as a result. The crack
possessor, in fact, receives the same offense level as that applicable to those
who finance terrorist organizations ....
[I]n child pornography cases, the sentence for an individual who sends a
computer image of "virtual" child pornography, made without the use of
actual children, would face a sentence twice as harsh as that allowed under the
Guidelines for a defendant who actually rapes a child....
[T]he unreported transfer of large amounts of cash is illegal because it may
support other outlawed activities such as theft. But... the sentence for such a
cash transfer, even in the complete absence of proof that there was any
underlying illegal activity, leads to greater punishment than that allocated to
the woman who actually steals the same amount of money....
[T]he danger of illegally possessed firearms is clear-they may be used for
violence. Under the Guidelines, however, the punishment for possessing the
weapon ... is often more severe than that for actually using a gun in a violent
crime.
Sentencing judges sometimes have departed from the Guidelines to redress
the unequal or disproportionate treatment they mandate for codefendants and
co-conspirators convicted of the same crime. Appellate courts have nearly
always reversed these judges, declaring that disparity between codefendants is
not a permissible reason for departure.
18
The offenses most frequently prosecuted in the federal courts are drug
crimes (40.4% of the caseload1 9) and economic crimes, including white-collar
crimes (21.6%20). In both of these offense categories, sentences are driven by
measures that often allocate punishments arbitrarily.
2 1
Sentencing reformers imagined that guidelines would take into account the
17. Mark Osler, Indirect Harms and Proportionality: The Upside-Down World of
Federal Sentencing, 74 Miss. L.J. 1, 1-6 (2004) (footnotes and parenthetical specifications of
offense levels omitted).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 73 (1st Cir. 2004); United States
v. Blackwell, 127 F.3d 947, 951-52 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d
1446, 1449 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[T]he thrust toward equalization of sentences within a single
case is not, and by itself cannot be, 'an aggravating or mitigating circumstance' as that
phrase was employed by Congress... and reiterated by the Sentencing Commission .. ");
United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 459-61 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Changa, 901
F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming a district court's refusal to equalize the sentences of
co-conspirators). But see United States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268, 1273 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Daly, 883
F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989).
19. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at vi.
20. Id. at 47 fig.2.4.
21. The perception of many lawyers and judges is that the Guidelines work more
equitably in cases of violent crime, but violent crimes constitute less than 4% of the federal
criminal caseload. Id. at 68.
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same things that judges previously had taken into account but would do so in a
more uniform way. The guidelines would rein in outliers, minimize the role of
prejudice, and perhaps, if an expert commission saw the need, make some
changes in sentencing policy. Otherwise they would leave sentencing pretty
much unchanged.
This vision was probably hopeless from the beginning. It rested on the
assumption that mental processes can be captured in an algorithm. As the
reformers saw it, a commission would need only to determine the components
of judges' sentencing decisions and give them the proper weight. Of course,
because the commission might not think of everything, the judges should be
allowed to depart in truly exceptional cases. It was as though reformers noticed
that a reviewer named Ebert often gave more stars to a motion picture than a
reviewer named Roeper. The reformers could create a commission to determine
how motion picture reviewers made their decisions and prepare a grid to guide
them. 22
The belief that detailed, mandatory guidelines could largely duplicate the
process by which pre-Guidelines judges made sentencing decisions failed to
consider how the human mind differs from a sentencing commission and how
decisions made ex ante differ from those made ex post. In drafting general
guidelines, the Sentencing Commission lists aggravators when doing so "seems
like a good idea at the time." Of course a criminal should receive a harsher
sentence if he employs a weapon, and of course he should receive a harsher
sentence if he abducts his victim. Most criminals who abduct their victims use
weapons, however, and the Commission may not notice that the two
aggravators together produce a far greater enhancement than it has prescribed
for a criminal who inflicts a life-threatening injury.23 The Sentencing
Commission cannot fully foresee how its sentencing factors will overlap,
interact, and compare with one another. A well-functioning human being who
simply assesses "desert" in one case after another is likely to avoid the
Commission's moral errors and inequalities. Some algorithm may be hidden in
this person's mind, but if so, it is too complex and elusive to be brought to the
surface and written down. Moreover, a large number of Guideline factors can
itself generate inequalities when judges differ in applying these factors and
their differences cumulate rather than cancel each other out.24 Finally, the
belief that the Guidelines could largely replicate the process by which pre-
Guidelines judges made their decisions overlooked the inability of language to
capture recognized differences. Describing in general terms the appropriate
22. If the film-review analogy seems inapt because not much is at stake in film reviews
(except for actors and movie moguls), consider the extent to which detailed, mandatory
guidelines could solve the problem of faculty disparity in grading seminar papers.
23. See Michael O'Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 249, 252
(2005).
24. See id.
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influence of situational and personal characteristics on sentences is often
impossible. Quantifying harms, however, seems easy. Just count the stolen
dollars and weigh the drugs. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines became crime
tariffs mostly because the Sentencing Commission found it easier to write them
that way.
The quantity of unlawful drugs possessed by a dealer and the amount of
money stolen by a thief usually are relevant to the sentences they should
receive. A thief who reaches into a till, however, generally takes whatever is
there, be it fifty dollars or five thousand. Moreover, when the Guidelines sweep
in drugs and losses tenuously connected to the crimes of which offenders have
been convicted, sentences driven by weights and measures can be especially
arbitrary. A later Part of this Article discusses sentencing in white-collar crime
cases. The remainder of this Part discusses drug crimes.2 6
A drug courier often does not know what drug is inside the package she
carries, let alone how much of that drug there is. The courier may be a woman
traveling with children who was recruited partly because she seemed unlikely
to fit a drug-courier profile or to be searched thoroughly by a customs agent.
After being apprehended by a diligent customs agent, this courier might be
taken to court to play a game called "Sentencing Guidelines" or "Wheel of
Fortune." In this game, the host opens the sealed packages of the courier-
contestants and weighs their contents. The weights determine which contestants
win twenty-year, all-expense-paid visits to Leavenworth, Kansas, and which
receive lesser prizes.
To determine the sentence of a crop duster who knowingly sprayed a field
of marihuana, a court now must count the plants in the field and multiply by
100 grams. The Guidelines declare, "In the case of an offense involving
marihuana plants, treat each plant, regardless of sex, as equivalent to 100 G of
marihuana."
27
What constitutes a plant, however, has been the subject of extensive
litigation. 28 In one case, a marihuana grower with very bad timing made 502
small cuttings from larger plants shortly before his arrest. 29 To support his
contention that the appropriate standard was "viability," he offered expert
testimony that most of his cuttings would not have survived and that "[a]
25. See infra text accompanying notes 101-11.
26. Cf JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION 2 ("The
Judicial Conference... encourages the Commission to study the wisdom of drug-sentencing
guidelines which are driven virtually exclusively by the quantity or weight of the drugs
involved.").
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, drug quantity tbl.n.E (2004).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that
plants need not be alive); United States v. McMahon, 935 F.2d 397 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding
that unusable plants about to be discarded must be included).
29. United States v. Eves, 932 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1991).
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cutting becomes a plant when it develops a root system sufficient to allow the
cutting to maintain open stomas so that it can exchange gas and provide for
energy requirements." 30 The Tenth Circuit rejected the grower's contention,
declaring, "If a cutting has a root ball attached it will be considered a plant."
3 1
The Sentencing Commission later endorsed the Tenth Circuit standard, noting
that "this issue arises frequently."
33
In the cases of drug couriers and others, the Sentencing Guidelines may
yield disparate sentences even when they direct a judge to weigh only the drugs
the offender himself possessed at the time and place of his crime. The
Guidelines, however, frequently require courts to weigh drugs possessed at
other times and places and drugs possessed by other people.
In constructing the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission used a
principle it called "real-offense sentencing." 34 This term had come into use as a
matter-of-fact recognition that a legal system dependent on plea bargaining
frequently fails to convict offenders of their real crimes. When a bargain has
enabled an offender to avoid conviction for his most serious crimes, a judge
must sentence him within the limits applicable to the less serious crimes to
which he has pleaded guilty. Before the Guidelines, scholars and judges
debated whether, in selecting the sentence for these crimes, the judge should
take account of the offender's "real" crimes.
The Sentencing Commission extended the concept of "real-offense
sentencing" much more broadly-to everything it called "relevant conduct." It
defined relevant conduct to include, among other things, "all acts and
omissions ... that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme
or plan as the offense of conviction." 35 Under this provision, courts often weigh
drugs the prosecutor never charged as part of the offender's "real offense" and
even drugs the jury acquitted the offender of possessing. 36 Relevant conduct
also includes "all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
furtherance of... jointly undertaken criminal activity." 37
The elasticity of terms like "reasonably foreseeable," "same course of
conduct," and "common scheme or plan" gives judges some practical discretion
in deciding which drugs to weigh. The Sentencing Commission notes,
"Evidence from field research suggests that.., ambiguity in the rule, and
reluctance to ... subject defendants to ... severe penalties ... limits the rule's
30. Id. at 858.
31. id. at 860.
32. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D.l1, cmt. n.17 (2004).
33. Id. app. C, amend. 518.
34. See David Yellen, Reforming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Misguided
Approach to Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 267 (2005) (in this Issue).
35. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.3(a)(2) (2004).
36. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
37. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2004).
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application." 3 8 When judges exercise their discretion in differing ways, unequal
sentences occur. More troubling disparities arise, however, when there is no
play in the rule and judges must apply it.
In San Francisco, a steadily employed, forty-nine-year-old dockworker
with no criminal record accommodated a friend by driving him to a drug
transaction. Because this friend sold more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, a
federal judge was required to sentence the dockworker to ten years. 39 The next
case before the judge might have involved an otherwise identical offender with
a less high-rolling friend. In this case, the judge would have imposed a
substantially smaller sentence.
A small-time street dealer was arrested in New York with two vials of
crack. Then the dealer's supplier was apprehended with 586 additional vials in
his hat. Another dealer's supplier might have been arrested with only ten
vials; a third dealer's supplier might not have been arrested; and a fourth
dealer's supplier (or the supplier's supplier) might have been found with a
warehouse full of cocaine. To people of ordinary moral sensibilities, sentencing
the four street dealers to very different prison terms would seem arbitrary.
Federal court lawyers and judges, however, get used to it.
III. THE DISPARITIES THAT THE GUIDELINES WERE INTENDED To CORRECT
Every assessment of sentencing disparity rests on a normative judgment,
and there are no uncontroversial criteria for sentencing. There is, however, a
useful way for dispassionate social scientists to study sentencing disparity.
Rather than accept the Guidelines' own standards as a baseline, researchers can
assess the influence on sentencing of clearly inappropriate circumstances.
Federal sentencing reformers emphasized three things that, in their view,
should not determine sentences-the identity of the sentencing judge, the
region of the country in which an offender is sentenced, and the offender's
race, ethnicity, or gender.
38. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 144. Paul
Hofer, the Sentencing Commission's Senior Research Associate, and two co-authors add:
Some judges may... adopt a result-oriented approach that begins with the sentence they
wish to impose and works backwards to identify the facts leading to that result. It may not
even be necessary to ignore facts. Many findings required by the guidelines are sufficiently
subjective to afford significant discretion to those who wish to use it .... The relevant
conduct guideline, on which all other guideline calculations rest, is notoriously complicated
and subject to differing interpretations.
Hofer et al., supra note 10, at 258-59.
39. See New Drug Law Leaves No Room for Mercy, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1989, § 1A, at
28.
40. See United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1991).
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A. Judicial Variation
The Sentencing Commission notes, "The legislative history of the
[Sentencing Reform Act of 1984] clearly shows ... that different treatment by
different judges was the chief problem the Act was designed to address, as well
as regional differences in sentencing. ' 4l
The first post-Guidelines study to focus on how much sentencing outcomes
depended on the identity of the sentencing judge is also the study whose
methodology is the easiest for nonprofessionals to understand. Joel Waldfogel
examined sentences in three federal districts in which cases were assigned
randomly to judges and every judge appeared to have a comparable mix of
cases over time.4 Waldfogel determined the length of the average sentence
imposed in each district before and after the Guidelines and then how much
each individual sentence deviated from the average. He found that the judges
who imposed below-average sentences before the Guidelines imposed below-
average sentences thereafter. The judges who formerly imposed above-average
sentences still imposed them too.
Waldfogel averaged the amount by which all sentences in each court
deviated from the court's overall average to determine the "mean absolute
deviation." If the Sentencing Guidelines had reduced the influence of the
judge's identity on sentencing-that is, if they had brought judges closer
together-this measure of disparity should have declined following
implementation of the Guidelines. Waldfogel found, however, that judicial
disparity increased significantly in two of the three districts studied and
remained essentially unchanged in the third. In the District of Connecticut, the
mean deviation increased from 4.2 months before the Guidelines to 9.9 months
after; in the Southern District of New York, it rose from 5.8 to 10.4 months;
and in the Northern District of California, it rose insignificantly from 4.2 to 4.4
months. 43
Critics of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines warned of the evils the
Guidelines would produce, but none of them suggested (or imagined) that the
Guidelines would increase interjudge disparity. Three later studies did report
some reductions of disparity in the sentences judges imposed, but the
reductions ranged from small to negligible.
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
42. Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Federal Sentencing: Evidence
from Three Districts, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 151 (1991).
43. Because Waldfogel's post-Guidelines period began before the Supreme Court's
decision in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 381 (1989), his post-Guidelines figures
might have included some cases not sentenced under the Guidelines. See supra note 6. Paul
Hofer and his co-authors also criticized Waldfogel for not taking account of "overall changes
in the lengths of sentences for some types of crimes under the guidelines." Hofer et al., supra
note 10, at 279. Without these changes, however, the increase in disparity might have been
greater. See supra note 8.
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Abigail Payne examined interjudge disparity in three federal district courts.
She concluded that the disparity attributable to differences among the judges
before the Guidelines was small-less than 5% of the total variation in
sentences. 4 4 A consistent finding of the post-Guideline studies has been that
interjudge variation before the Guidelines was much smaller than sentencing
reformers evidently believed it to be. The sentencing reformers relied in
significant part on differences in judicial responses to hypothetical cases, and
real-world sentencing is apparently different.4 5 Although the level of interjudge
disparity declined in two of the districts studied, Payne described the decline as
negligible.
46
A distinctive feature of Payne's study was its effort to distinguish the
influence of the Sentencing Guidelines from that of mandatory minimum
sentencing legislation that became effective at about the same time. Like the
Sentencing Guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences can reduce disparity-
for example, by requiring all judges to impose more severe sentences than any
of the judges would have chosen if allowed to consider cases on their merits.
Payne studied drug crimes and property crimes separately because, although
the Sentencing Guidelines applied to both sorts of crime, the mandatory
minimums applied only to the drug crimes. In two of her three districts, Payne
found no reduction of disparity in property-case sentences. She inferred that the
overall reduction of disparity was attributable mostly to the mandatory
minimums.
A public defender, an economist, and a prominent critic of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines conducted the study most supportive of the hypothesis
that the Guidelines had reduced interjudge disparity. These authors reported
44. A. Abigail Payne, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Really Matter? An Analysis of the
Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three Federal District Courts, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
337, 338 (1997).
45. See, e.g., Joel Waldfogel, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Justify Empirically Based
Sentencing Guidelines?, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 293 (1998); see also Hofer et al., supra
note 10, at 296. Sentencing reformers regularly cited the study of differing judicial responses
to case reports described in ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974). This
study showed that judges do disagree substantially about some cases.
46. The Sentencing Commission's Senior Research Associate and his co-authors
objected that "like Waldfogel, Payne used data from a transitional period, which included
many non-guideline cases mixed with cases sentenced under the guidelines, thus diluting any
effect of the guidelines." Hofer et al., supra note 10, at 281. This criticism was unfounded. In
Payne's post-Guidelines cases, sentences were imposed between January 1, 1989, and
December 31, 1991. Payne, supra note 44, at 345. Because the Supreme Court's decision in
Mistretta came on January 18, 1989, only a very small number of non-Guidelines cases
could have found their way into her post-Guidelines group.
47. James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON.
271 (1999). Kate Stith's comprehensive criticism of the Guidelines appears in KATE STITH &
Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1998).
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that the expected difference in the sentence lengths of two judges receiving
comparable cases was sixteen to eighteen percent in the pre-Guidelines period.
This difference fell to somewhere between eight and thirteen percent after the
48Guidelines were implemented. In temporal terms, the expected interjudge
difference dropped from 4.9 months before the Guidelines to 3.9 months
after.
4 9
The study conducted by Paul Hofer and other members of the Sentencing
Commission's staff examined more courts and more cases than any other study.
In the first part of this study, the Hofer group focused on the nine cities in
which at least three judges had imposed sentences in both the pre-Guidelines
and post-Guidelines periods. (These periods were separated by ten years.) The
researchers reported that, before the Guidelines, only 2.32% of the variation in
sentences was explained by the identity of the sentencing judge. This figure fell
to an even smaller 1.24% in the post-Guidelines period, a reduction of 1.08%.5
0
In the pre-Guidelines period, offenders could expect the identity of the
sentencing judge to make a difference of about 7.87 months in their sentences.
With the Guidelines in effect, the expected difference in sentence attributable to
the judge fell to 7.61 months-0.26 months less. 51 In other words, in the
average case, the Guidelines might have reduced interjudge sentencing
disparity by about a week.
A second part of the Hofer study focused on the forty-one cities that had
three or more judges on the bench during both the pre-Guidelines and post-
Guidelines periods (whether or not they were the same judges). In the pre-
Guidelines period, the identity of the sentencing judge explained 2.40% of the
variation in sentences. This figure fell to 1.64% in the post-Guidelines period-
a 0.76% reduction.
52
In temporal terms, the variation among judges in the forty-one-city study
increased in the post-Guidelines period-from 8.89 months before the
Guidelines to 9.69 months after, an increase of approximately three weeks.
53
The explanation for this apparent anomaly (a larger temporal variation
attributable to the judge but a smaller percentage of total variation attributable
to the judge) is that the sentences judges imposed in the post-Guidelines period
were more severe than the sentences judges imposed before the Guidelines. A
larger number of months was therefore a smaller percentage of the total average
sentence, and a larger numerical variation in months was also a smaller
variation in the percentage of variation explained.
A judge who is more severe than his colleagues in white-collar crime cases
48. Anderson et al., supra note 47, at 303.
49. Id. at 294.
50. Hofer et al., supra note 10, at 287.
51. Id. at 287-88 & tbl.1.
52. Id. at 289.
53. Id. at 290 tbl.2.
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may be more lenient in drug cases. The sentencing disparities resulting from
this judge's idiosyncrasies could disappear in the analysis described above-an
analysis focusing on what Hofer and his colleagues called the "primary judge
effect." The researchers therefore also sought to study what they called
"offense type by judge interaction." They reported, however, that "[t]he offense
type by judge interaction fell in the forty-one-city analysis but actually
increased in the nine-city analysis."
54
The Hofer group did not attempt to separate the effects of the Sentencing
Guidelines from those of mandatory minimum sentences. It seems likely,
however, that most or all of the reported reduction in interjudge disparity was
attributable to the mandatory minimums rather than the Guidelines. By far the
largest reductions in interjudge disparity occurred in the two offense categories
affected by the mandatory minimums-drugs and firearms. Reductions were
smaller in fraud and larceny cases, and interjudge disparity actually increased
substantially in immigration and robbery cases.
55
All of the post-Guidelines studies focused on the sentences judges imposed
rather than the sentences offenders actually served. The reported reductions in
disparity in the sentences imposed were small, and if the Parole Commission
reduced disparity at all in the pre-Guidelines period, its leveling was likely to
have matched or exceeded that accomplished by the Guidelines. The
Sentencing Guidelines do not appear to have lessened disparity at all in the
variable that matters most to offenders: how much time they must serve.
Despite its flaws, the Sentencing Commission's 1991 report did address
whether the Guidelines had reduced disparity in the time offenders served. The
Hofer group and the Commission's Fifteen-Year Report did not consider this
question although the data were apparently at hand. The Hofer group reported
that it had "conducted some analyses using as outcome the expected time to be
served" and that it calculated the time to be served for the pre-Guidelines
period by simulating the parole-release guidelines. 56 After this pregnant
announcement, however, Hofer and his co-authors said no more.
A reader of the Sentencing Commission's Fifteen-Year Report would not
learn that, according to one study by the Commission's staff, interjudge
disparity decreased by only one week per case. This reader also would not learn
that, according to another staff study, this disparity actually increased by three
weeks per case. Instead, the reader would discover statements like this:
Rigorous statistical study both inside and outside the Commission confirm
[sic] that the guidelines have succeeded at the job they were principally
designed to do: reduce unwarranted disparity arising from differences among
judges.... [T]he "primary judge effect" was reduced by approximately one
third to one half with the implementation of the guidelines, and "interaction
54. Id. at 297.
55. Id. at 293 tbl.3.
56. Id. at 312; see also id. at 287 n.125.
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effects" have been reduced even more substantially.
57
The Commission's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding; the best
judgment is that the Sentencing Guidelines have failed at the job they were
principally designed to do. The small reduction in interjudge disparity reported
by the Commission seems attributable mostly to the mandatory minimum
sentences rather than the Guidelines, and the reduction accomplished by both
devices together was probably less than the Parole Commission achieved in the
pre-Guidelines period. The Sentencing Commission's 258-box sentencing grid
appears to have lived in vain.
B. Geographic Variation
Judge Patti Saris was a staff attorney for the Senate Judiciary Committee at
the time of the Sentencing Reform Act. She recalls, "The rallying cry was: why
should a bank robber in California get a different sentence from a bank robber
in Texas?"'58 Congressional committees cited differences in the average
sentences imposed for federal crimes in different federal districts.59
Similarly arresting differences among federal districts exist today. 60 To
revisit Judge Saris's example, the average sentence for robbery in the Northern
District of Texas in fiscal year 2002 (142 months) was almost twice what it was
in the Central District of California (72 months). The robbery sentence in the
Central District of Texas was more than twice the average robbery sentence in
the Southern District of New York (62 months). The average drug-trafficking
sentence in Manhattan (89 months) was twice the average drug-trafficking
sentence in Brooklyn (44 months). The average drug-trafficking sentence in the
Southern District of California was 23 months, one-third of what it was in the
Northern District of California (74 months) and one-fourth of the average drug-
trafficking sentence in the Central District of California (95 months).
Differences like these established the need for sentencing reform in 1984.
They apparently do not prove anything today. The Sentencing Commission
cautions against giving weight to uncontrolled comparisons because "regional
variations do not necessarily indicate unwarranted disparity."6 1 As the
Commission emphasizes, the mix of cases within an offense category can differ
from one district to the next.
57. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note I, at 140.
58. Saris, supra note 8, at 1028.
59. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41 & 45 tbl. (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3224, 3228 tbl.1.
60. The source of all the figures that follow is U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, DISTRICT, AND CIRCUIT: OCTOBER 31, 2001, THROUGH
SEPTEMBER 30, 2002, http://www.ussc.gov/ JUDPACK/JP2002.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2005).
61. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 100 (emphasis
in original).
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In the same article in which they reported on interjudge disparity, the
Commission's research staff presented findings on geographic variation. In the
staff s nine-city study, this variation accounted for only 1.03% of the total
variation in sentences prior to the Guidelines. This figure grew to 3.59% after
the Guidelines went into effect. 62 In the pre-Guidelines period, an offender
could expect the jurisdiction in which his case arose to make a difference of
about 5.24 months in his sentence. With the Guidelines in effect, the expected
difference in sentence attributable to the jurisdiction in which a case arose
increased to 12.94 months.
63
In the staff's forty-one-city study, the court in which a case was heard
accounted for 1.81% of the total variation in sentences in the pre-Guidelines
period. It accounted for 5.64% of this variation in the post-Guidelines period.
In temporal terms, the expected variation per case was 7.70 months before the
Guidelines and 17.97 months after.
64
The Sentencing Commission repeatedly characterized the reported
reduction in interjudge disparity from 2.32 to 1.24% as a 50% reduction (which
it almost was). By the same measure, eographic disparity more than tripled
after implementation of the Guidelines.
The Commission's Fifteen-Year Report did not declare that geographic
disparity had tripled under the Guidelines. On a page of the Report in which a
boldface box proclaimed that "[t]he best and most recent statistical analyses
indicate that the guidelines have sizgnificantly reduced interjudge disparity
compared to the preguidelines era,"6 the Commission noted delicately, "The
available evidence suggests that regional disparity remains under the
guidelines, and some evidence suggests it may even have increased among drug
trafficking offenses."
67
The Hofer group's findings are subject to two interpretations. On the one
hand, the numbers are small enough that one could shrug them off and proclaim
the Guidelines a bust. The Guidelines do not seem to have made much
difference in the things social science researchers can measure. On the other
hand, the numbers are large enough that one could reasonably take them
seriously. On this view, the reported increase in geographic disparity swamped
the reported reduction in interjudge disparity so that the Guidelines were an
even bigger bust. The most important lesson of the Hofer group's findings may
not be that geographic disparity increased but rather that disparity increased.
The actions of some participants in the criminal justice system-prosecutors,
62. Hofer et al., supra note 10, at 289.
63. Id. at 288 tbl.1.
64. Id. at 290 tbl.2.
65. To present variations in small numbers as large percentages may be a rhetorical
trick, but it is the Sentencing Commission's trick.
66. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 94.
67. Id.
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judges, or whoever else really determined sentences-had caused more
arbitrary variation in criminal sentences than occurred before the Guidelines.
When an increase in regional disparity is accompanied by a reduction in
interjudge disparity, one might infer that differing judicial attitudes could not
explain the increased geographic variation. The Hofer group's methodology,
however, does not directly support this inference. Because Hofer and his
colleagues measured judicial disparity only within jurisdictions, their findings
do not preclude judicial responsibility for the increased geographic variation.
The best judgment, however, is that some reduction in judge-produced
disparity was more than offset by an increase in prosecutor-produced disparity.
The Hofer group's data were gathered before the introduction of "fast-track"
programs that now generate huge geographical variations in drug and
immigration sentences. 68 The increased regional variation that Hofer and his
colleagues discovered, however, was attributable mostly to drug cases. They
commented:
In addition to the discretion they have always employed to bring and dismiss
charges or to make sentence recommendations, the last ten years have
witnessed the creation of new tools by which prosecutors can control
sentencing. These include mandatory minimum statutes that limit judges'
discretion, motions for departure based on a defendant's substantial assistance
in the prosecution of others, which are solely in the hands of prosecutors, and
factual stipulations accompanying plea agreements, which under the
guidelines have a direct and predictable impact on the guideline range
applicable to a case. The mechanisms designed to regulate this discretion...
may not be capable of-reventing prosecutorial decisions from reintroducing
unwarranted disparity.
C. Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress mandated that the
Sentencing Guidelines be "entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin,
creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders." 7° Before the Guidelines became
effective, blacks and whites convicted in the federal courts were imprisoned at
exactly the same rate (54%). Because nearly all defendants convicted of
immigration violations were imprisoned and these defendants were
overwhelmingly Latino, Latinos went to prison at a higher rate (69%). The
average maximum sentences of the whites, Latinos, and blacks sent to prison
were similar-50 months for whites, 52 months for Latinos, and 53 months for
68. Fast-track programs are described in text at infra notes 99-100.
69. Hofer et al., supra note 10, at 300. Stephanos Bibas's article in this Issue explores
questions of regional disparity in greater depth and detail. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating
Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REv. 137 (2005) (in this Issue).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2005).
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blacks. 7 1
The picture in the federal courts is different today: 78% of all white
offenders, 79% of all black offenders, and 88% of all Latino offenders are
imprisoned.72 The average sentences of the imprisoned whites and Latinos
remain similar--46 months and 44 months respectively. The average sentence
of blacks is 83 months.
73
On a Sentencing Commission graph showing the estimated time to be
served by sentenced offenders over time, three lines depict the sentences of
blacks, whites, and Latinos. 74 These lines start at the same level, but with the
arrival of the Guidelines and new mandatory minimum sentencing legislation,
the line for blacks begins a skyrocketing ascent. A racial gap appears at about
the time most federal courts implemented the Guidelines and the mandatory
minimum sentences. The gap widens abruptly as the Guidelines go into effect
in the remaining courts. The line for black offenders reaches its high point in
the mid-1990s with blacks imprisoned for periods twice as long as they were
before the Guidelines. Then the line declines slightly. The lines showing the
sentences of white and Latino offenders begin at the same level as the line for
blacks but increase far less dramatically. The racial gap that arrived with the
Guidelines has widened enormously.
This racial gap is largely, but not entirely, driven by legally relevant
considerations and by one legally relevant consideration in particular. Eighty-
one percent of the defendants prosecuted for crack cocaine offenses in the
federal courts are black.75 In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress
distinguished for the first time between crack and powder cocaine and
mandated more severe sentences for crack cocaine. It did so by requiring 100
times more owder cocaine than crack to trigger the same mandatory minimum
sentences.
71. See Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, Why Did Racial/Ethnic
Sentencing Differentials in Federal District Courts Grow Larger Under the Guidelines?, 6
FED. SENT'G REP. 223, 223 (1994).
72. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
2002, at 419 tbl.5.20 (2004).
73. Id. at420 tbl.5.21.
74. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 116 tbl.4.2.
Note that the sentences described in the preceding paragraph were maximum sentences. This
paragraph discusses changes in the sentences that offenders were expected to serve.
75. Id. at 132.
76. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(iii)-(B)(iii) (2005). The two drugs are pharmacologically
similar. Because crack is usually smoked rather than inhaled through the nose, however, it
provides more mind-bangs per buck and is probably more addictive. Many of the beliefs
about crack that were common in the 1980s now appear to be myths. For example, using
crack during pregnancy poses no greater risk of producing birth defects than using other
drugs, including powder. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note
1, at 132. Some of the crack myths of the 1980s (including the belief that men crazed by the
drug had superhuman strength) might have been influenced by views of the people thought
to use it.
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The U.S. Sentencing Commission treated Congress's mandatory minimum
sentences as its starting point. Inserting the drug quantities specified by the
mandatory minimums into a seventeen-level gradation of quantities, the
Guidelines imposed many sentences above the mandatory minimums. Today
"[a]bout 25 percent, or eighteen months, of the average expected prison time of
73 months for drug offenders... can be attributed to guideline increases above
the mandatory minimum penalty levels.'
77
Congress may not have intended its mandatory minimums to generate the
range of penalties the Guidelines prescribed. Congress believed that the
quantities for which it mandated five-year terms identified "managers of retail
traffic" while those triggering ten-year terms identified "manufacturers or the
heads of organizations." 78 Congress apparently had in mind a two-tier
sentencing system.
Although decisions of the Sentencing Commission aggravated the effects
of the crack/powder disparity, the Commission proposed legislation and
submitted a Guidelines amendment in 1995 to eliminate the disparity. For the
first time in the Guidelines' history, Congress and the President rejected a
Guidelines amendment approved by the Commission.79 Two weeks before
President Clinton signed the legislation restoring the 1-to-100 crack/powder
ratio, he observed in a speech at the University of Texas:
[B]lacks are right to think something is terribly wrong.., when almost one in
three African American men in their 20s are either in jail, on parole, or
otherwise under the supervision of the criminal justice system-nearly one in
three. And that is a disproportionate percentage in comparison to the
percentage of blacks who use drugs in our society. Now, I would like every
white person here and in America to take a moment and think how he or she
would feel if one in three white men were in similar circumstances.
8 1
Since its unsuccessful effort in 1995, the Sentencing Commission has
submitted two other proposals to reduce the crack/powder disparity, but
Congress has not acted.
The racial gap in federal sentences cannot entirely be explained by the 1-
to-100 crack/powder ratio and other legally relevant variables. The Sentencing
Commission reported, for example, that although blacks constitute 48% of the
offenders who appear to qualify for a mandatory firearms enhancement in drug
77. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFrEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 54.
78. Id. at 48 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 845, pt. 1, at 16-17 (1986)). At least with respect
to crack, these beliefs were clearly erroneous. Five grams of crack, the amount needed to
trigger a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, is "the amount a heavy user might
consume in a weekend." Id. at 132.
79. See Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995).
80. President Clinton's Statement on Signing Legislation Rejecting U.S. Sentencing
Commission Recommendations, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1700 (Oct. 30, 1995).
81. President Clintons's Remarks at the University of Texas at Austin, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1600, 1602 (Oct. 16, 1995).
82. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
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cases, they constitute 64% of the offenders who receive it. 83 In addition,
prosecutors seek "substantial assistance" departures for blacks and Latinos less
often than for whites, and this disparity persists when researchers do their best
to control for legally relevant variables. The disparity in substantial assistance
departures may reflect the lesser ability of blacks and Latinos to provide
information useful to prosecutors, the greater reluctance of blacks and Latinos
to provide this information (because of their greater loyalty to co-offenders or
their greater fear of reprisals), or the prosecutors' racial favoritism. When
minority defendants do receive substantial assistance departures, the departures
they receive are smaller than those received by whites.
8 5
More generally, the Sentencing Commission reports that, after controlling
for legally relevant variables, black men are 20% more likely to be imprisoned
for drug offenses than are white men, and Latino men are 40% more likely.
When sent to prison, the sentences of black and Latino men for drug crimes are
likely to be about 10% (7 months) higher than those of whites.
86
A gender gap in federal sentences preceded the Guidelines. The time
served by men in federal prisons before the Guidelines exceeded that served by
women by about nine months or 50%. In the years since the Guidelines were
implemented, the gender gap has grown. The time served by men increased
96% after the Guidelines while that served by' women increased 75%. Men now
serve 51 months on average and women 28.87 The previous nine-month gender
gap has grown to 23 months.
Unlike the growing racial gap in federal sentences, the increasing gender
gap cannot be largely explained by statutory innovations like the crack/powder
disparity or other legally relevant variables. The Sentencing Commission
reported that, after controlling for relevant variables, men were twice as likely
to be imprisoned for drug crimes as women. Prison sentences in drug cases and
other cases were twenty-five to thirty percent longer for men. Women received
more substantial downward departures.
88
The Sentencing Commission's Fifteen-Year Report observes, "Part of the
more lenient treatment may arise.. . from differences between the genders that
are relevant to sentencing but not well captured by the available data." 89 The
Report mentions that women may take less-central roles in criminal activity
than men and may be "more instrumental in raising their children than their
83. Id. at 90.
84. See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN
EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 13-14
& n.30 (1998) (indicating that blacks are 8% to 9% less likely than whites to receive
substantial assistance departures and that Latinos are 7% less likely).
85. Id.
86. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at xiv-xv.
87. Id. at 127-28 & fig.4.9.
88. Id. at 127-28.
89. Id. at 128.
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male counterparts." 90 The Guidelines, however, provide that "family ties and
responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure
may be warranted" 9 1 and add that a "defendant's role in the offense is relevant
in determining the applicable guideline range.. . but is not a basis for departure
from that range. ' 92 The Sentencing Commission's Fifteen-Year Report
apparently took a different view. Like the Guidelines' effort to restrict
interjudge and geographic disparity, the Guidelines' effort to limit racial,
ethnic, and gender disparity appears to have been a bust.
IV. UNDER THE RADAR: THE SOURCES OF DISPARITY
An earlier Part of this Article noted that legislatures and sentencing
commissions can themselves be sources of sentencing disparity. This Part
focuses on other participants in the criminal justice system and the disparities
they produce. Much disparity flies beneath the radar, safe from detection by
statistical analysts.
A. Judges
The Feeney Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against
the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 200393 was prompted
by statistics. Senator Hatch explained why this amendment limited and
sometimes forbade judicial departures from the Sentencing Guidelines:
[C]ourts, unfortunately, have strayed further and further from [the
Guidelines'] system of fair and consistent sentencing .... [D]uring the period
1991 ... to the year 2001, the number of downward departures-in other
words, soft-on-crime departures, excluding those requested by the
Government for substantial assistance and immigration cases along the
Southwest border-has steadily climbed. In 1991, the number of downward
departures was 1,241 and rose by 2001 to a staggering total of 4,098. This
chart shows the rate of downward departures has increased over 100opercent
during this period.., and nearly 50 percent over the last 5 years alone.
94
According to the Justice Department, downward departures of the sort
described by Senator Hatch increased from 9.7% of all cases in 1996 to 14.7%
in 2001. 9' In 2001, however, 40% of all departures for reasons other than
90. Id. at 128-29.
91. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5HI.6 (2004).
92. Id. § 5H1.7.
93. Pub. L. No. 10-821, 117 Stat. 650 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
94. 149 CONG. REc. S5113, S5115 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003). Representative Tom
Feeney maintained that judges were "arbitrarily deviating from the sentencing guidelines...
based on their personal biases and prejudices, resulting in wide disparity in sentencing." 149
CONG. REC. H2403, H2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003).
95. See Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing
Practices? The Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Feeney Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL
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substantial assistance were initiated by the Justice Department itself, mostly as
a result of plea agreements. 96 Although the number of departures increased,
their magnitude declined so that sentences did not become more lenient.9 7
Judges appointed by Republicans were as likely to depart downward as judges
appointed by Democrats.
98
Geographic variations in departure rates suggest significant sentencing
disparities. The General Accounting Office (GAO) found that, after controlling
for offense and offender characteristics, downward departures in drug cases
were 6.87 times more likely in the Ninth Circuit than in the Eighth.99 The
Sentencing Commission noted, however, that "fast-track" programs created by
prosecutors in districts with high drug and immigration caseloads accounted for
most of the disparity found by the GAO. These programs offer sentences far
below Guidelines levels to defendants who waive everything-the right to
challenge their indictments, the right to discovery, the right to seek the
suppression of illegally obtained evidence, the right to trial, the right to appeal,
and the right to seek post-conviction relief.1 00
The Commission excluded "fast-track" cases from its own analysis. Using
the Eighth Circuit figures as a baseline, it concluded:
The odds of receiving a downward departure for mitigating circumstances
remain over three times higher in the Ninth Circuit than in the Eighth, almost
three times higher in the Second, and two times higher in the DC circuit. In the
Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, the odds of departure are just 17 percent that
of the Eighth Circuit.
10 1
The power to depart and the power to select a sentence within the
Guidelines range are the most visible aspects of the sentencing discretion
judges possess, but they are not the most important ones. To indicate more
likely sources of judge-created sentencing disparities, this Part describes some
sentencing issues in United States v. Segal, a case in which I am one of the
defendant's counsel.
Michael Segal owned and managed a large insurance brokerage. His
company received premiums from its customers, which it paid to insurance
carriers as the premiums became due, ordinarily thirty to forty-five days after
they were received. Illinois insurance regulations required the agency to keep
these premiums in a premium fund trust account (PFTA) in the interim. The
LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (2005).
96. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 111.
97. Schanzenbach, supra note 95, at 32-33.
98. Id. at 39.
99. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-105, FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES:
DEPARTURES FROM SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES, FISCAL
YEARS 1999-2001 app. III, at 50 (2003).
100. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625-26 (2002) (describing the fast-track
program in the Southern District of California).
101. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 112.
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government alleged that Mr. Segal was responsible for shortages in his
agency's PFTA. At one point, according to the government, the PFTA
contained $30 million less than it should have. The government did not contend
that Mr. Segal or his company ever failed to pay a premium when it was due,
and no carrier or customer ever complained of any loss. 
10 2
After Mr. Segal was convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and racketeering,
the court ordered him to forfeit his company, worth tens of millions of dollars,
and to forfeit $30 million in addition. Although Mr. Segal is a first offender, the
government maintains that the Guidelines dictate a prison sentence of between
thirty years and life. Mr. Segal maintains that the Guidelines make him eligible
for a sentence of less than three years. Here are some of the issues in dispute:
1. The Sentencing Guidelines set sentences in fraud cases primarily on the
basis of the financial loss caused by the fraud.10 3 Whether the PFTA deficit
caused no loss or a loss of $30 million is the largest point of disagreement.
Thousands of pages of reported decisions consider the meaning of loss under
the Guidelines, and the amount of loss appears to be disputed in nearly all
white-collar crime cases.
2. Even if the PFTA deficit is treated as the measure of loss, the amount of
this deficit is in dispute. A government witness testified that the deficit should
be measured by consolidating the accounts of all of the insurance brokerages
Mr. Segal owned, offsetting the deficit of one company's PFTA with the
surplus in another's. A consolidated accounting would cut the deficit in half.
3. The Guidelines provide that the loss shall be reduced by whatever
restitution the offender made before his offense was detected, and they define
the time of detection as "the earlier of the time the offense was discovered by a
victim or government agency or the time the defendant knew or should have
known that the offense was detected or about to be detected by a victim or
government agency." 10 4 Before Mr. Segal was charged with a crime or
regulatory violation, his company eliminated the deficit. The government
contends, however, that this restitution came too late. A witness reported a
conversation in which Mr. Segal mentioned an anonymous letter the Illinois
Department of Insurance had received concerning the deficit. The Director of
the Illinois Department of Insurance testified, however, that neither he nor, as
far as he knew, any other member of the department had received such a letter.
Determining whether the Department of Insurance received an anonymous
letter-and if so, when-could make a difference of twenty-five years in Mr.
Segal's sentence.
102. Federal prosecutors rarely act as de facto state insurance commissioners. They
apparently took that role in this case because Mr. Segal was reputed to possess useful
information about prominent politicians.
103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.1, cmt. n.3(A) (2004) (defining
loss as pecuniary harm).
104. Id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(E)(i) (internal numbering omitted).
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4. The government also contends that Mr. Segal should have known that
his offense was about to be discovered. Some employees of Mr. Segal's
company, after complaining to him about the PFTA deficit, resigned to work
for a competitor. The government contends that Mr. Segal should have realized
that the employees who had complained to him would also complain to the
authorities. A judicial determination of what Mr. Segal "should have known"
also could make a twenty-five-year difference in his sentence.
5. The government contends that Mr. Segal's restitution was insufficient
because he replenished the PFIA with borrowed funds rather than with his
own, a circumstance that Mr. Segal maintains makes no difference.
6. Mr. Segal and the government disagree about what version of the
Guidelines to apply. The Sentencing Commission substantially increased the
penalties for white-collar crimes in amendments to the Guidelines that became
effective in November 2001. The government contends that the fraudulent
scheme continued after the date of these amendments. Mr. Segal maintains that
the crime of mail fraud is complete when an offender places an item in the mail
with the intent to defraud and that all of the mailings alleged by the government
occurred before the Guidelines amendments.
7. The government contends that Mr. Segal's sentence should be enhanced
because his offense involved sophisticated means. 105 Mr. Segal maintains that
there is nothing sophisticated about withdrawing money from a bank
account. 106
8. The government argues that Mr. Segal's sentence should be enhanced
because he derived more than one million dollars from a financial
institution. 107 Mr. Segal argues that an insurance brokerage does not fall within
the Guidelines' definition of "financial institution."
9. The government seeks an enhancement for abuse of trust. 10 8 Mr. Segal
maintains that because the definition of his offense required an abuse of trust,
this enhancement would constitute double counting.
10. The government also contends that Mr. Segal's sentence should be
enhanced because he was the leader of a criminal activity that involved five or
more participants or was otherwise extensive. 1° 9 Mr. Segal replies that no
evidence shows that the company employees identified by the government ever
did anything criminal.
105. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(9).
106. A judge can determine whether an offender's means were sophisticated with
virtually no risk of reversal by an appellate court. Compare United States v. Rettenberger,
344 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that simulating an illness to defraud an insurance
company is "sophisticated"), with United States v. Kaufman, 800 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Ind.
1992) (holding that maintaining fraudulent and nonfraudulent sets of books is not
"sophisticated").
107. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (2004).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 3B1.l(a).
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11. Finally, the government maintains that Mr. Segal's sentence should be
enhanced because he obstructed justice." l0 The government alleges that Mr.
Segal made a false statement during a two-hour interrogation immediately after
his arrest. Mr. Segal denies both that his statement was false and that it could
have obstructed the government's investigation. The government dismissed the
false-statement count in Mr. Segal's indictment shortly before his case was
submitted to the jury, but its dismissal of the false-statement charge does not
preclude it from resurrecting this allegation as a sentencing enhancement.
This list presents a simplified description of some of the issues posed by
the Sentencing Guidelines in Mr. Segal's case. Of course, Mr. Segal is the same
person and his crime remains the same crime regardless of how these issues are
resolved." l Resolving them would not advance anyone's understanding of
what punishment Mr. Segal deserves.
If a dozen judges were to throw away the Guidelines and consider the
punishment Mr. Segal deserves, they might well disagree. None of them,
however, would make twenty-five years of imprisonment depend on whether
the Illinois Department of Insurance received an anonymous letter the day
before or the day after Mr. Segal replenished his company's PFTA. None of
them would worry about whether a $30 million PFFA deficit should be
characterized as no loss or as a $30 million loss. None of them would think it
important to decide whether an insurance brokerage should be called a financial
institution. All twelve judges might agree that the issues briefed and argued in
Mr. Segal's case have little bearing on the sentence he should receive.
The asserted justification for spending pages, hours, legal-research fees,
and sweat on the sorts of legalisms illustrated by the Segal case is that doing so
promotes equality in sentencing. The considerations that the Guidelines make
decisive may be artificial, but artificiality is preferable to the unrestricted play
of personality.
The premise of this argument seems flawed. Few of the issues presented in
Mr. Segal's case are so clear that every straight-shooting judge would resolve
them the same way. In resolving many of these issues, a judge would almost
certainly be influenced by his own view of the seriousness of Mr. Segal's
crime. There is no reason at all to suppose that a dozen judges asked to decide
Mr. Segal's case under the Sentencing Guidelines would be less likely to
disagree than a dozen judges asked to determine his sentence without the
benefit of the Guidelines. Because the Guidelines force yes-or-no choices with
large consequences, the disparity in sentences might be greater. When judges
110. See id. § 3C 1.1.
111. It seems wasteful (indeed, almost unreal) to labor over Guidelines issues of
characterization now that the decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), has
made the Guidelines advisory. Booker, however, requires the sentencing judge to calculate
the Guidelines sentence. In addition, the judge who will determine Mr. Segal's sentence is a
Vice Chair of the Sentencing Commission.
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disagree in resolving what appear to be issues of fact and law, however, people
no longer call their disagreements "sentencing disparity." The judges'
resolutions of these issues become part of the controls from which disparity is
measured.
B. Defense Attorneys
A lawyer in a case like Mr. Segal's might have noted that his client's
allegedly fraudulent conduct extended beyond the effective date of the current
Sentencing Guidelines and might have failed to challenge the government's
assumption that the current version of the Guidelines apply. This lawyer might
thereby have cost his client ten years in the penitentiary. No state and, indeed,
no other jurisdiction in the world makes an offender's sentence as dependent on
the quality of his counsel as do the federal courts under the Guidelines. Finding
what is relevant to a case in the 629-page Guidelines Manual, the 1100 pages of
appendices explaining Guidelines provisions, and the endless judicial decisions
interpreting the Guidelines takes a very good lawyer, and not every federal
defendant has one. The disparate performances of attorneys generate sentencing
disparities that fly beneath the radar.
C. Probation Officers
The official who will first pass judgment on the complex legal issues posed
by Mr. Segal's case has no legal training at all. Before the Guidelines,
probation officers conducted investigations of the background and conduct of
offenders and prepared presentence investigation reports concerning the
correctional treatment these offenders should receive. The Guidelines made the
traditional function of these officers superfluous, but jobs for the boys are jobs
for the boys. In the Guidelines regime, probation officers became unlicensed
lawyers, law clerks, and Guidelines specialists. 112
Probation officers seem no less likely than judges to vary in their
application of the Guidelines. They may be more likely. Pamela Lawrence and
Paul Hofer asked forty-six randomly selected probation officers to apply the
relevant conduct Guideline to four offenders who had participated in the same
drug conspiracy. They found substantial variation. For the least culpable of the
offenders, the probation officers' calculations ranged from one to five years in
112. The decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), made the
Sentencing Guidelines advisory and directed judges to shape sentences in accordance with
the general objectives specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2005). Booker appeared to allow
probation officers to resume their historic role, but at least in the Northern District of Illinois,
they do not want to. They insist that they are Guidelines specialists, and they do not discuss
§ 3553(a) objectives in their reports. If a defendant wishes to present an argument based on
§ 3553(a), he must present it directly to the sentencing judge.
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D. Law Enforcement Officers
Because drug sentences under the Guidelines are determined by drug
quantities, undercover agents can increase an offender's sentence by persuading
him to purchase more of a drug or by continuing to sell to him until he passes a
sentencing threshold.1 14 Agents may be able to manipulate other circumstances
affecting the offender's sentence as well, such as the presence of a gun and the
location of the crime. 115 Some courts have recognized "sentencing entrapment"
as a justification for reducing sentences in cases of outrageous law enforcement
conduct,116 but others have not.' 7 The manipulation of sentencing exposure by
law enforcement officers appears to be a significant source of disparity.l11
E. Prosecutors
In 1989, I wrote that although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
likely to increase the power of prosecutors, "[gluilty plea rates are currently so
high that even substantial increases in prosecutorial bargaining power cannot
yield great increases in these rates."1 19 I was wrong. Guilty pleas, which
accounted for 87% of all federal convictions in the years before the Guidelines,
account for 97% today. 12 Marc Miller remarks that the Guidelines have
"achieved the virtual elimination of criminal trials in the federal system." 121
The Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences have set the
stage for the "good-cop, bad-cop" stratagem on a grand scale. Congress and the
Sentencing Commission play the bad cops, threatening the accused with harsh
113. Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of the Application of
the Relevant Conduct Guideline lBI.3, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 330 (1992).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 929 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1991).
115. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 82.
116. See United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1993).
117. See United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668 (11 th Cir. 1992).
118. See Eric P. Berlin, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure To Eliminate
Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1992 WiS. L. REV. 187;
Andrew G. Deiss, Comment, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment: Prearrest Sentence
Manipulation by Investigators Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 419
(1994); Jeffrey L. Fisher, Comment, When Discretion Leads to Distortion: Recognizing Pre-
Arrest Sentence-Manipulation Claims Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 2385 (1996).
119. Albert W. Alschuler, The Selling of the Sentencing Guidelines, in THE U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 49, 91 n.4 (Dean J.
Champion ed., 1989).
120. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
121. Marc L. Miller, The Foundations of Law: Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54
EMORY L.J. 271, 277 (2005).
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treatment. The prosecutor takes the part of the good cop, promising to protect
the defendant if he abandons the right to trial and cooperates. Substantial
sentencing discretion remains except for defendants who resist the prosecutor's
will.
The Sentencing Commission's policy statements admonish judges to reject
plea agreements that undermine the Guidelines.122 One study concluded,
however, that "key participants in the sentencing process were generally
unfamiliar with.., the policy statements."' 123 The Sentencing Commission
observes that "[j]udicial review of plea agreements pursuant to the policy
statements.., appears to be very limited."124 In each of the years between
1997 and 2002, the reason judges gave most often or next-most often for
departing from the Guidelines was "pursuant to plea agreement." 125 Most plea
agreements, moreover, do not require departure from the Guidelines. Bending
the Guidelines is enough. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (c)(1)(C)
provides:
[T]he plea agreement may specify that an attorney for the government will...
agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition
of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or
policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a
recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea
agreement). 
1 2 6
In 2003, a memorandum by Attorney General John Ashcroft declared,
"Any sentencing recommendation made by the United States in a particular
case must honestly reflect the totality and seriousness of the defendant's
conduct and must be fully consistent with the Guidelines and applicable
statutes and with the readily provable facts about the defendant's history and
conduct." 127 Like similar directives from Attorneys General before him,
Ashcroft's apparent restriction of plea bargaining made headlines. On the
surface, it appeared to be a significant reform. The memorandum's exceptions,
however, largely swallowed its rule. Prosecutors could bargain when their cases
were weak, when they could get useful information from a defendant, when
immigration and drug cases clogged the courts, when enhancements would
remove any incentive for a defendant to plead guilty, or when the prosecutors
122. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2 (2004).
123. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 87 (citing
Diane Marks, Prosecutorial Discretion in Connecticut: A Lesson in Indirect Constraint,
Paper Presented at the Yale Law School Symposium on Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(2002)).
124. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 144.
125. Id. at92.
126. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(c)(l)(C).
127. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors
Regarding Departmental Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of
Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03-
ag_516.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
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could get written approval from their superiors. The prosecutors apparently
could bargain whenever doing so would advance their interests. The only thing
they could not consider was the merits of a case.
I am told that, in one federal district, the United States Attorney circulated
the Ashcroft memorandum to the other lawyers in his office with a note saying
that it appeared to require no change in "what this office is doing already." In
this district, prosecutors and defense attorneys often bargained directly about
how much time a defendant would serve and then determined what Guidelines
applications would implement their bargains. The Sentencing Commission
notes that prosecutors have viewed directives like Attorney General Ashcroft's
with skepticism and that "nationwide DOJ policies... were less determinative
of prosecutorial conduct than internal U.S. Attorney's office policies."'
12 8
Together with mandatory minimum sentencing legislation, the Guidelines
have added to the prosecutors' armaments. They have given prosecutors more
leverage partly by increasing the severity of criminal sentences. The Sentencing
Reform Act provides, "The sentencing guidelines prescribed under this chapter
shall be formulated to minimize the likelihood that the Federal prison
population will exceed the capacity of the Federal prisons," 129 but the number
of inmates in federal prisons has more than quadrupled since 1985.130 This
growth in the federal prison population is not attributable to increased crime
rates but is attributable in part to larger federal caseloads. 13 1 It is also partly
attributable to the fact that a higher proportion of convicted offenders go to
prison. 32 What has driven the explosion in the prison population even more
than these developments, however, is the greater length of prison terms. The
Sentencing Commission notes that "federal offenders sentenced in 2002
will ... spend about twice as long in prisons as did offenders sentenced prior to
passage of the [Sentencing Reform Act]."' 33
Congress allows departures from both the Guidelines and mandatory
minimum sentences for "substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person," but it allows these departures only when
prosecutors request them. 134 When a prosecutor seeks a substantial assistance
departure, the bottom is the limit. No statute or guideline constrains the extent
of the defendant's reward. Departures for substantial assistance occur in about
128. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 84.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (2005).
130. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
2002, at 487 tbl.6.12 (2004).
131. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 76.
132. See id. at vi ("The use of imprisonment spiked in the early years of guidelines
implementation and then resumed a long gradual climb, reaching 86 percent of all offenders
by 2002, about 20 percent higher than it had been in the preguidelines era.").
133. Id. at46.
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2005); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.I
(2004).
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17% of all cases and other departures in about 18% more. 135 Substantial
assistance departures, however, are larger and account for twice as much
variation in federal sentences (4.4% of all variation versus 2.2%).136 The
frequency of substantial assistance departures varies greatly from one district to
the next.
137
Congress provided another escape route from mandatory minimum
sentences in a "safety-valve" provision for low-level drug offenders. This
escape route is open, however, only for offenders who cooperate with
prosecutors.'
38
As initially approved, the Sentencing Guidelines offered a two-level
reduction for "acceptance of responsibility."' 39 The Sentencing Commission
later provided another one-level reduction for "timely" notification of an intent
to plead guilty. 140 In the PROTECT Act of 2003, Congress prohibited judges
from granting a reduction for timely notification of an intent to plead guilty
unless a prosecutor requested it.141
In several federal jurisdictions with high immigration and drug caseloads,
prosecutors created what they called "fast-track" programs offering sentences
far below Guidelines levels to defendants who waive almost all of their
procedural rights. 14 2 In the PROTECT Act, Congress authorized departures
from the Guidelines of no more than four levels to implement these
programs. 
143
Prosecutors control whether mandatory minimum sentences will be
imposed. In a recent case, a twenty-two-year-old defendant was arrested on two
occasions for possessing both drugs and a firearm. Although he had no criminal
record before these arrests, his conviction of the second offense required the
court to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years, which the
offender would be required to serve after he completed his first sentence. When
Judge Myron H. Thompson imposed the total sentence of forty years required
by section 924 of Title 18, he called this sentence "draconian." He noted that
not only would the offender's child grow up without a father but his
grandchildren, if he had any, would be teenagers or young adults before he was
135. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at xiii. In some
jurisdictions, substantial assistance and other departures are so frequent that only a minority
of offenders receive Guidelines sentences. See United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259,
275 n.53 (D. Mass. 2004).
136. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFrEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 102.
137. Id. at 103.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f(5) (2005).
139. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2004).
140. Id. § 3El.l(b).
141. PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(g)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 671.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
143. PROTECT Act, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 675.
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released. 144
Judge Thompson and other judges are required to impose the mandatory
minimum sentences specified by section 924, but prosecutors have a choice.
The Sentencing Commission reports that, after the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in charging and plea bargaining, only 20% of the offenders who used
firearms to commit drug crimes received the mandatory sentences that section
924 prescribes, and offenders who carried firearms without using them received
the section 924 enhancements even less often.
145
It is difficult to believe that Congress cares about sentencing disparity in
the slightest. After many of its members ringingly denounced disparity,
Congress enacted the PROTECT Act restricting downward departures by
judges. The same statute, however, validated "fast-track" programs that
effectively jettisoned the Guidelines. The PROTECT Act followed the pattern
of the previous twenty years-jeering disparities created by judges while
cheering those created by prosecutors. Judge William G. Young remarks,
"Enhanced plea bargaining is actually the central goal of the guidelines."
' 146
When Senators Thurmond and Kennedy co-sponsored the Sentencing Reform
Act, observers wondered which one was selling the farm. Today we know the
answer, and it was not Senator Thurmond. Increasing prosecutorial power and
the severity of criminal punishments was not the unintended consequence of
Guidelines designed to reduce sentencing disparity. Instead, it was the point all
along. Disparity was just a code word. 147
CONCLUSION
In a decision requiring courts to weigh sugar cubes, blotter paper, and other
carrier media, Judge Easterbrook wrote, "Experience with the guidelines
suggests ... [that every] attempt to make the system of sentences 'more
rational' carries costs and concealed irrationalities, both loopholes and
unanticipated severity. Criminals have neither a moral nor a constitutional
claim to equal... treatment."
' 14 8
Sentencing guidelines are premised on the view that criminals do have
some claim to equal treatment, and except, perhaps, for Judge Easterbrook,
everyone I know favors the idea of sentencing guidelines. 149 With Judge
144. United States v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
145. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFtEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 90.
146. United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 270 (D. Mass. 2004).
147. Some people, including most of the legal academics who write about sentencing,
did imagine that disparity reduction was the name of the game, but these ingrnues were easy
marks for those who sought a system of harsh penalties controlled by prosecutors in which
virtually every defendant, if sane, would bend to the prosecutors' will.
148. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1326 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom.,
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
149. I offer my own view of how useful guidelines could be structured in Alschuler,
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Easterbrook, however, one may doubt that the quest for perfect parity among
rapist-robber-muggers justifies a 629-page guidelines manual with 1100 pages
of appendices and more legalisms than Jarndyce v. Jarndyce. The effort to
promote equality through detailed directions has not worked for the reasons
Judge Easterbrook said it could not work.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have not reduced disparity between
black and white offenders. Instead, the Guidelines and Congress's mandatory
minimum sentencing legislation have created and aggravated racial disparities.
Under the Guidelines, the gender gap in federal sentences has also widened,
and geographic disparities have increased. The Guidelines may have reduced
the influence of judicial personality on sentencing but only slightly and only
when one looks exclusively to the sentences judges initially impose. The Parole
Commission almost certainly did as well as the Guidelines or better in reducing
disparity in the sentences offenders actually serve. The artificial rules and
standards of the Sentencing Guidelines have created inequalities of their own,
and the price of whatever success the Guidelines have achieved in reducing
judge-created sentencing disparities has been the burgeoning of prosecutor-
created disparities.
The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 14, at 939-49, and Albert W. Alschuler,
Monarch, Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 723, 731-32 (1993).
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